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"Keep on Keeping On" 
AFRICAN AMERICANS AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF 
BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION IN VIRGINIA 
Brian J. Daugherity 
The fiftieth anniversary of the Brown v. Board of Education decision 
(1954) resulted in an outburst of publications and scholarly activity 
related to the history of U.S. school desegregation. Conferences, jour-
nals, books, and films examined the many stories behind Brown and 
critically examined the decision's legacies and impacts. Much of this 
scholarship shed new light on the decision and its results, but an impor-
tant part of the Brown story remains largely untold-how African 
Americans and predominantly black civil rights organizations worked 
to implement t~e Supreme Court's decision after 1954.1 
This chapter examines African American efforts to implement the 
Brown decision in Virginia. While considering how government officials, 
segregationist organizations, and white supporters influenced the imple-
mentation process, this study focuses on how the National Association 
for the Advancement of Colored People and its supporters in Virginia 
sought to bring about school desegregation in the state. Blending African 
American, southern, legal, and civil rights history, the story sheds new 
light on the school desegregation process and the early years of the civil 
rights movement in Virginia.2 
The NAACP had a strong record in yirginia long before Brown. 
Created in the 1910s, the state's earliest branches were among the first 
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in the South. The Virginia "State Conference," created in 1935, was the 
first in the nation. Its successful implementation of NAACP policies and 
rapid growth encouraged the national office of the NAACP to create 
State Conferences throughout the nation. 3 In 1947, the Virginia State 
Conference was the first in the country to hire a full-time executive sec-
retary, W. Lester Banks, and by the 1950s the State Conference boasted 
a membership of twenty-five thousand in more than one hundred 
branches around the state, making it the largest in the South.4 
The NAACP's principal opponent in the school integration battle in 
Virginia was the state's Dem0cratic political machine, the Byrd Organi-
zation. As governor in the 1920s, Harry Flood Byrd Sr. had consolidated 
government positions and used patronage to create a political oligarchy 
that ruled Virginia for the middle years of the twentieth century. He ran 
the organization from Washington, D.C., representing Virginia as a U.s. 
senator from ·1933 to 1965. A southern Democrat known for his fiscal 
conservatism, Byrd regularly clashed with the national Democratic Party 
on spending issues and the party's growing support of civil rights. 
Though not virulently racist, the Byrd Organization's leadership strongly 
supported states' rights and opposed efforts to limit its authority over 
the commonwealth, including the right to maintain segregated schools.5 
Virginia's schools had been racially segregated since their founding 
just after the Civil War. In 1902, a new, post-Reconstruction state con-
stitution required segregated education as well. During the debate over 
~ts adoption, Paul Barringer, chairman of the faculty at the University of 
Virginia, argued that educational opportunities for African Americans 
be limited to "'a Sunday-school training,'" because the principal func-
tion of black Virginians was as a '''source of cheap labor for a warm cli-
mate."'6 By the 1920s, state legislation had expanded segregation to 
include virtually every aspect of life, and clarified how segregation 
would affect Virginia's public schools. 
The results were devastating for black education. In 1925, Virginia 
spent an average of $40.27 per year on each white public school student, 
but only $10.47 on each black.? Facilities for blacks, teacher salaries, 
course offerings, and educational resources suffered as a result. In 1940, 
L. P. Whitten of Abingdon pleaded with national NAACP director of 
branches William Pickens: "If you will see that it is carried in the 
Pittsburgh Courier, I can secure pictures of all schools here so that the 
public may know of the deplorable conditions."8 
In the 1930s, the Virginia NAACP brought legal attacks against these 
inequities. Staff attorneys, including Oliver White Hill and Spottswood 
On" 43 
Robinson III, played leading roles in the national NAACP's equalization 
campaign of the 1930s and 1940s. The national NAACP focused its 
equalization efforts on Virginia, and by the late 1940s equalization law-
suits had been filed against over a hundred districts throughout the 
state.9 Working closely with Special Counsel Thurgood Marshall, the 
association's head attorney, Hill and Robinson helped develop legal tech-
niques that led to the improvement of black educational opportunities 
throughout the South. IO Oliver Hill's personal relationship with Thurgood 
Marshall, begun as classmates at Howard Law School, developed into a 
professional partnership.ll 
World War II broke out in the midst of the equalization campaign. 
Oliver Hill, W. Lester Banks, S. W. Tucker, and a number of other civil 
rights leaders from Virginia entered the military, slowing down the push 
for educational equality. At the same time, World War II increased Afri-
can American aspirations for equal treatment. In Virginia and elsewhere, 
postwar activism revitalized the equalization campaign and set the stage 
for an even greater legal assault-on segregation itself. 12 
It was yet another World War II veteran, L. Francis Griffin, who 
connected the NAACP to one of its most important anti-segregation 
cases in Virginia, Davis v. Prince Edward County. Griffin, from Farmville, 
served in the army for four years during World War II, and then returned 
to Prince Edward County and took over as minister of his father's 
Baptist church. Recognizing the injustices of the county's educational 
system, Griffin and other black leaders pushed county officials to equal-
ize the schools until the spring of 1951, when students at the all-black 
Moton High School walked out of school in protest. 
Initially the students sought only a new black high school. State 
NAACP leaders, however, explained that the association no longer filed 
equalization lawsuits and would only file a lawsuit challenging segrega-
tion in the county's public schools. With some reservations, the black 
community agreed, and Davis v. Prince Edward County was filed in fed-
eral district court in May 1951. Later, the case became one of the five 
cases bundled together by the U.S. Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of 
Education. 13 
As might be expected, Virginia's political leaders reacted negatively 
to the Brown decision. Over the previous three years, the state's legal 
team had presented an extremely vigorous defense of segregation before 
the courts involved in Brown. Following the decision, Senator Byrd 
called the ruling "the most serious blow that has been struck against the 
rights of the states."14 When some state officials offered less provocative 
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responses, Byrd reacted angrily, and officials around the state noticed. 
By midsummer, Governor Thomas B. Stanley-who had initially spoken 
of compliance-declared, "I shall use every legal means at my command 
to continue segregated schools in Virginia. "15 
Virginia's outcry clearly demonstrated that few of the state's public 
officials had previously entertained the idea of abandoning segregation 
in the public schools. Though federal courts had ordered the common-
wealth to begin desegregating its institutions of higher learning, and also 
interstate transportation, those changes were resisted by most white 
Virginians. The state's clear and extensive defense of segregation in the 
litigation leading to Brown, and state officials' negative reactions to 
Brown, suggest that segregation was still a remarkably solid, and enthu-
siastically embraced, institution within the commonwealth. The his-
torian Robbins Gates-discussing the period before Brown-noted, 
"There is no reason to assume that any responsible, white, public offi-
cial in Virginia envisioned that state's governmental policy as moving 
'gradually' toward a time when white and Negro children would attend 
integrated public schools. "16 
Following the decision, state officials rapidly developed the means 
to preserve segregated education. In August 1954, Governor Stanley 
appointed a thirty-two-man board, known as the Gray Commission, to 
study the Brown decision and recommend a course of actionY Its 
leader, Garland Gray, was a state senator from Southside, Virginia, and 
a Byrd Organization stalwart. In October, Gray proclaimed, "'I have 
nothing against the Negro race as such, and I have lived with them all 
my life, but I don't intend to have my grandchildren go to school with 
them.">18 
Governor Stanley also organized a meeting of southern governors in 
Richmond to rally resistance to Brown. Nine attended the June 1954 
gathering, with three others sending representatives. After a daylong 
closed-door session, nine of the states resolved "not to comply voluntar-
ily with the Supreme Court's decision against racial segregation in the 
public schools."19 The remaining states-Kentucky, Maryland, and West 
Virginia-decided their problems of adjustment were surmountable. 
That these three states bordered Virginia seemed of little concern-
Virginia aligned itself with states further south. 
In fact, the meeting of southern governors suggested that Virginia 
was prepared to help lead the South in opposition to the Supreme 
Court's ruling. As former state legislator Benjamin Muse put it in the 
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Washington Post, "Virginia, with its glorious role in the early history of 
the republic and again in the struggle for the great Lost Cause-also 
with its genteel and honored political leadership of the day-was surely 
indicated to carry the banner of the South in this latest conflict. "20 
At the same time, the NAACP geared up to force implementation of 
the historic decision. Its national office, located in New York City, tra-
ditionally made the major policy decisions for the association, and the 
implementation of Brown would be no exception.21 The national office 
included the NAACP's board of directors, executive secretary and staff, 
and the association's many departments.22 It also worked closely with 
the NAACP's Legal Defense and Educational Fund, a separate but 
related organization that handled much of the litigation involved in the 
implementation of Brown.23 Clearly, the association's school desegrega-
tion efforts would be directed from New York City. 
In the association hierarchy, State Conferences made up the level 
below the national office. By 1954 a State Conference existed in every 
southern state. Their responsibilities included the implementation of 
national office policies and the establishment and oversight of local 
branches. Branches, sometimes referred to as "chapters," were the low-
est level of the NAACP hierarchy. Their objectives and policies were 
strongly influenced by the national office, which also assigned annual 
branch membership and fundraising goals.24 
The weekend following the Brown decision, the national NAACP 
held a conference on school desegregation in Atlanta, Georgia. At the 
gathering, staff from the national office outlined a previously developed 
program for implementing Brown to the association's southern State 
Conference presidents.2s The southern leaders adopted resolutions-
proposed by the national office-emphasizing the importance of national 
and state oversight of the implementation process.26 In a form letter sent 
to southern branches shortly after the meeting, the national office empha-
sized, "It is imperative that all of our units act in concert as directed to 
effectively implement this historic decision. "27 
The conference delegates also adopted the Atlanta Declaration, 
which set forth the NAACP's implementation program for the immedi-
ate future. The declaration asked NAACP branches to collect signatures 
from black parents who favored immediate desegregation in order to 
press school boards in local communities for compliance. Rather than 
initiate widespread litigation to force desegregation, however, the 
national office instructed its branches to negotiate and cooperate with 
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their local school boards.28 Branch leaders were encouraged to gather 
the support of various black and white community organizations to 
effectuate this process. As the Atlanta Declaration explained, "We are 
instructing all of our branches in every affected area to petition their 
local school boards to abolish segregation without delay and to assist 
these agencies in working out ways and means of implementing the 
Court's ruling. "29 
A month after the Atlanta Conference, the NAACP's annual conven-
tion in Dallas, Texas, solidified the implementation program and tried 
to spur its branches into action. Focusing on the process whereby Brown 
would be implemented, the convention provided guid~nce to branches 
during the interim between Brown and the Supreme Court's ruling on 
the implementation of Brown. 3o Daylong workshops explained the 
national office program and the prospective role of the branches. A key 
goal was building community support among whites as well as blacks to 
bring about desegregation. Local branches were again encouraged to 
seek support from ministers, labor unions, educational organizations, 
and social and civic groups for desegregation. 31 Litigation, effective but 
abrasive, was to be avoided. Conference delegates resolved that "the 
enjoyment of many rights and opportunities of first class citizenship is 
not dependent on legal action but rather on the molding of public sen-
timent and the exertion of public pressure to make democracy work."32 
Looking back, it is clear that NAACP leaders initially were over-
optimistic about the implementation of Brown. A number, including 
Thurgood Marshall, expected the decision to bring about rapid and pro-
found change.33 The historian Alfred Kelly, who worked closely with 
Marshall and other NAACP attorneys, later noted, "'In a sense, these 
men were profoundly naive. They really felt that once the legal barriers 
fell, the whole black-white situation would change."'34 Oliver Hill, head 
of the Virginia State Conference legal staff, explained that his optimism 
was based on the belief that southern whites respected the law. When 
Brown declared segregation unconstitutional, however, Hill noted that 
"many Negroes experienced a rude awakening as white folks' reputed 
great respect for the law disappeared."35 
While its legal staff worked with national office lawyers on argu-
ments for the Supreme Court's implementation decision, the Virginia 
State Conference directed its branches to begin working toward school 
desegregation. On May 26, 1954, executive secretary Lester Banks sent 
a letter to the officers of the conference's eighty-eight branches announc-
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ing a "State-wide Emergency Meeting" to discuss carrying out the 
national office's implementation program in Virginia. 36 The meeting 
took place in Richmond on June 6, 1954, and more than three hundred 
NAACP representatives from around the state attended. The delegates 
unanimously endorsed the recommendations of the Atlanta Conference, 
but noted that additional planning would be needed to implement the 
national office's program in Virginia. They decided that the State 
Conference, with branch input, should develop a statewide program that 
would allow the Virginia NAACP to operate with both "uniformity and 
efficiency." In the meantime, the delegates agreed to refrain from deseg-
regation activitiesY 
State Conference leaders also called upon the Virginia government to 
comply with Brown. In June, Oliver Hill and a small delegation of other 
African American leaders met with Governor Thomas B. Stanley. During 
the closed-door session, the black leaders suggested that Stanley position 
Virginia to lead the South in compliance with the ruling.38 Several months 
later, Hill and fellow NAACP attorney W. Hale Thompson, along with 
several white liberals and other African Americans, attended a public 
hearing on the Brown decision sponsored by the Gray Commission. Hill 
implored the commission, "Gentlemen, face the dawn and not the setting 
sun. A new day is being born."39 
The public hearing, however, symbolized the challenges facing the 
supporters of integration. Most of those who addressed the comJ;llission, 
including a number of public officials, called for the continuation of seg-
regation. After Sarah Patton Boyle, a native white Virginian, spoke in 
favor of integration, an audience member accused her of supporting 
the mongrelization of the white race.40 One leading white newspaper, 
the Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, called the event a "'field day for [white] 
extremists.' "41 
By then, segregationists had organized and developed plans for the 
post-Brown era. The state's leading segregationist organization, the 
Defenders of State Sovereignty and Individual Liberties, was established 
in October 1954 and grew rapidly. In the tradition of Virginia paternal-
ism, the group denounced violence and outright intimidation, focusing 
instead on political persuasion and social and economic pressure to 
bring about its goals. Based in Southside, the group rallied Virginians to 
oppose Brown on the basis of both white supremacy and states' rights.42 
Though only a small percentage of white Virginians joined the 
Defenders or other segregationist organizations, the vast majority did 
48 Brian 
support the preservation of segregation.43 Only white liberals, who 
made up a small percentage of the population, openly supported racial 
equality, and as they came under attack from segregationists, fewer lib-
erals publicly expressed support for integration over time.44 Another seg-
ment of Virginia's population-white moderates-strongly favored 
segregation, but encouraged compliance with Brown rather than openly 
defying the Supreme Court or abandoning the state's public schools.45 
Unfortunately for the NAACP, Virginia's segregationists initially domi-
nated the debate over school desegregation in Virginia, and they 
opposed integration, the NAACP, and the Supreme Court.46 
The high court announced its ruling on the implementation of Brown, 
commonly referred to as Brown II, on May 31, 1955. The decision, 
because it failed to establish a time frame for school desegregation and 
allowed federal courts to accept delays in desegregation, was widely 
viewed as a setback for the NAACPY The following month, the national 
office sponsored an "Emergency" Southwide Conference on Desegrega-
tion in Atlanta. At the conference, and again at the NAACP's annual 
convention in June, the association reiterated its commitment to the 
national office's original implementation program established in the 
spring of 1954. Perhaps underestimating the additional hurdles posed 
by Brown II, the national office maintained that, "In the overwhelming 
majority of instances it can be expected that complia~ce without legal 
action will be the rule, perhaps grudgingly and reluctantly in some areas, 
but compliance, nevertheless. "48 Southern branches were requested to 
engage local school boards and community organizations to press for 
desegregation that fall. 49 
The Virginia State Conference dramatically increased its desegrega-
tion efforts following the implementation ruling. On June 12, 1955, the 
State Conference sponsored another statewide meeting to explain how 
to carry out the NAACP program in Virginia. NAACP officials told 
branches in communities that were acting in "good faith"-where 
school boards were making a "prompt and reasonable" sta,rt toward 
desegregation-to work with school officials and community organiza-
tions to bring about desegregation at the earliest practicable date. 
Branches in communities with recalcitrant school boards, however, were 
ordered to formally petition their school boards for the admittance of 
black students into the white schools.50 
Virginia's branches undertook the petitioning process with vigor. 
Association members convinced black parents in many communities to 
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support their desegregation efforts, despite growing white opposition. 
By the end of the summer, NAACP branches had submitted petitions to 
school boards in Alexandria, Arlington, Charlottesville, Isle of Wight 
County, Newport News, and Norfolk. Others were in preparation. The 
first real steps toward bringing about desegregation in Virginia had been 
taken, laying the groundwork for possible litigation. Still, each school 
board flatly refused to desegregate its schools that falLS1 
At the same time, examples of growing defiance in Virginia troubled 
the State Conference. In June, the state board of education ordered the 
continuation of segregation for the 1955-56 school year. In November, 
the Gray Commission suggested ways the state could negate or minimize 
the impact of Brown. The Defenders of State Sovereignty spoke of aban-
doning the state's public schools completely, and a growing number of 
political leaders supported the indefinite maintenance of school segrega-
tion statewide. 
Virginia's segregationists were fortified by the lack of support for 
integration shown by President Eisenhower and a strong axis of oppo-
sition in the United States Congress. The president supported gradual 
change and compliance with the law but declined to playa leading role 
in the school desegregation process.52 Roy Wilkins later commented: 
"President Eisenhower was a fine general and a good, decent man, but 
if he had fought World War II the way he fought for civil rights, we 
would all be speaking German today."53 In Congress in March 1956, 
101 representatives and senators adopted the Southern Manifesto, pledg-
ing to use all legal means to prevent the integration of schools in the 
South. Virginia's Harry Byrd helped draw up the measure.54 
In the midst of this rising opposition, the national office of the 
NAACP became increasingly skeptical about the prospects for voluntary 
compliance with Brown. Federal district court rulings in the summer of 
1955-involving two of the cases that were part of the original Brown 
decision-failed to bring about school desegregation that fall, as the 
NAACP had requested.55 Growing racial violence in the South, includ-
ing the harassment of NAACP members and the murder of Emmett Till, 
also influenced NAACP leaders.56 A growing number in the national 
office believed that widespread litigation might be the only method to 
force the South to comply with Brown.57 
In January 1956, abandoning its initial implementation plan, the 
NAACP announced a massive increase in southern school desegregation 
lawsuits.58 The national office set up a timetable for filing the suits at a 
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southwide conference in Atlanta in February. It chose to proceed state-
by-state, filing litigation based on local circumstances (the level of com-
mitment within the black community and the likelihood of community 
resistance), available legal aid, and the case histories of federal judges, 
some of whom were more liberal than the general white southern pub-
lic.59 Legal action begalJ that spring in eight southern states, including 
Virginia, which had completely resisted desegregation thus far. 60 
The Virginia NAACP filed lawsuits in four communities in April 
and May 1956. The chosen locations were Newport News, Norfolk, 
Charlottesville, and Arlington-all moderate urban areas. In addition, 
litigation against Prince Edward County was renewed. Without excep-
tion, the class-action lawsuits sought to bring about school desegrega-
tion by September 1956.61 As Oliver Hill explained, "The reasonable 
time has passed."62 
As might be expected, the new NAACP litigation brought tensions 
in Virginia to the exploding point. Animosity toward the association, 
already obvious, skyrocketed. Harassment of association members and 
supporters increased, and even white liberals urged the state NAACP to 
reconsider its approach.63 Looking back in 1961, Benjamin Muse wrote, 
"It is difficult to describe the intensity with which the NAACP was hated 
by white Virginians. "64 
The NAACP litigation also prompted the state of Virginia to react. 
Historians of the civil rights era often portray the rise of state-sanctioned 
massive resistance as a reaction to the growth of federal power repre-
sented by the Brown decision. In this interpretation, massive resistance 
represents a manifestation of states' rights, and most southern resistance 
is aimed at the federal government and the federal court system. This 
portrayal, however, minimizes the influence of African American agency 
in the post-Brown milieu. Clearly the NAACP's shift toward widespread 
litigation, and the filing of lawsuits in early 1956, fueled the rise of mas-
sive resistance. The state of Virginia-and the South as a whole-was 
responding to its greatest threat.65 
In February 1956, following a series of inflammatory editorials in a 
leading Virginia newspaper, the Virginia state legislature adopted a 
Resolution of Interposition, pledging to oppose the implementation of 
Brown. 66 The resolution resembled statements adopted by other south-
ern legislatures that spring, as well as the Southern Manifesto adopted 
by the U.S. Congress in March.67 The Virginia resolution's leading sup-
porter, Richmond News Leader editor James Jackson Kilpatrick, had 
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previously written to Senator Byrd, "I would toss an old battle-cry back 
at the NAACP: Hell, we have only begun to fight."68 
In the summer of 1956 Governor Stanley called a special session of 
the state legislature to deal with the unfolding situation. During a 
month-long session starting in late August, the General Assembly 
adopted twenty-three laws dealing with school segregation. Together the 
measures defended school segregation statewide and provided new pow-
ers to the governor to deal with unfavorable court decisions. 69 Seven of 
the bills were developed to impede the work of organizations promot-
ing school desegregation in the state. Referring to the NAACP, delegate 
James Thomson of Alexandria declared, "With this set of bills ... we 
can bust that organization ... wide open. "?O The state of Virginia had · 
declared war on the NAACP. 
As its school desegregation lawsuits wound their way through the 
court system, the State Conference worked to minimize the effects of the 
state's new "massive resistance" laws. For several years it sparred with 
legislative committees set up to investigate the supporters of school inte-
gration in Virginia.?1 The State Conference also initiated litigation against 
the Virginia attorney general with the goal of overturning the General 
Assembly's new legislation. These legal efforts quickly bogged down in 
the courts and the legislation reduced the effectiveness of the Virginia 
NAACP's school desegregation campaign. Publicly, the association argued 
that the anti-NAACP legislation united the black community behind the 
NAACP, but, when pressed, NAACP officials conceded that the attack 
had cost the association members, money, and valuable resources.72 
Massive resistance, however, did not shut down the NAACP in 
Virginia or force the abandonment of its desegregation campaign. To 
counteract the loss of members and funding, the State Conference asked 
its branches to increase membership drives and fundraising. One letter 
in early 1957 entreated, "Never before has our NAACP needed the sup-
port of every Negro citizen as it has today." ?3 To protect its finances, the 
State Conference transferred its "principal monies" to New York.?4 And 
perhaps most important, the association tried to maintain morale with 
a stream of pronouncements and memorandums. One, written by execu-
tive secretary Lester Banks in early 1957, urged members to "keep on 
keeping on" until the NAACP's objectives had been achieved.?5 Under 
the circumstances, it is doubtful Banks could have asked for more. 
In the meantime events unfolded in Virginia's courtrooms. In the 
summer of 1956, federal courts ordered desegregation in Charlottesville 
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and Arlington to begin during the coming school year. With help from 
the state, both localities appealed, temporarily suspending the court 
orders, but the victories by the NAACP helped fuel state legislators' 
anger that summer. Several of the state's new massive resistance laws, 
including a pupil placement provision, established additional school 
desegregation roadblocks, forcing NAACP attorneys to spend much of 
1956 and 1957 in court,76 By early 1958 the state's pupil placement law 
had been ruled unconstitutional, and federal judges in Virginia renewed 
orders calling for school desegregation the following September.77 
In September 1958, rather than allow federal courts to force 
Virginia to integrate, Governor J. Lindsay Almond Jr. closed nine pub-
lic schools in Charlottesville, Norfolk, and Warren County.78 Many of 
the affected white students enrolled in private schools funded by state 
taxpayer money and created with help from segregationist organiza-
tions. Moderate whites, on the other hand, spoke openly against the 
school closings and worked to protect public education in the common-
wealth. The NAACP filed suit immediately. Earlier that spring, Oliver 
Hill noted that if school closures were needed to "bring Virginia to its 
senses, then the sooner we reach that crisis the better. "79 
In January 1959, federal and state courts declared the cornerstone 
of massive resistance-Virginia's school-closing law-unconstitutional. 
Though extreme segregationists encouraged the state to adopt new leg-
islation to continue massive resistance, Governor Almond gaveo in. 
During a special session of the state legislature, Almond prevented the 
passage of additional massive resistance legislation and secured the 
repeal of the school-closing law. 80 Shortly thereafter, authorities 
reopened the closed schools in the affected localities, and on February 
2, 1959, twenty-one black students entered formerly all-white public 
schools in Virginia. Nearly five years after Brown, the Virginia NAACP 
had achieved one of its most cherished goals. 81 
Following this historic event, Virginia's public officials worked to 
minimize the amount of school desegregation that would take place in 
the coming years. Shifting from absolute defiance to token compliance, 
the General Assembly adopted new legislation in the spring of 1959. A 
new pupil placement law centralized the assignment process under the 
authority of the state Pupil Placement Board (PPB) and modified the 
process. The state also allowed school districts to adopt Virginia's first 
freedom-of-choice plans, which allowed parents to choose which schools 
their children would attend. A new tuition grant law supported white 
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students who chose to attend segregated schools.82 Explaining the result 
of this new legislation, historians Andrew Lewis and Matthew Lassiter 
write, "the policies which supplanted massive resistance-private school 
tuition grants, discriminatory pupil placement laws, freedom-of-choice 
plans, and incessant legal delays-thwarted substantial progress toward 
meaningful school integration throughout the 1960s.,,83 
Substantial progress would have taken even longer without the 
efforts of the State Conference. Its attorneys continued to press for 
desegregation in the federal courts, handling dozens of cases from many 
parts of Virginia in subsequent years. Its efforts forced additional local-
ities to admit African American students into their formerly all-white 
schools, and pressured districts which had already begun desegregation 
to admit greater numbers of black students. 
Over time, the pace of school desegregation increased. Under judi-
cial pressure, the state's Pupil Placement Board-which continued to 
reject most black applications for transfer-slowly increased the num-
ber of blacks admitted, and even forced some districts to begin desegre-
gation. 84 Other localities chose to assign pupils on their own and 
voluntarily increased the number of black students in formerly white 
schools.85 At the same time, Virginia's federal courts ordered token deseg-
regation throughout the state. Still the U.S. Supreme Court, which 
accepted token desegregation, expressed disappointment with the pace of 
southern school desegregation in 1963-a sign of what was to come.86 
Other branches of the federal government also placed increasing 
pressure on the white South. In 1964 Congress passed the Civil Rights 
Act, which threatened to cut federal funding to localities that refused to 
integrate their schools. An increase in federal public school funding the 
following year, coupled with compliance guidelines from the Depart-
ment of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW), offered additional 
incentives for southern districts to desegregate. 87 
Fearful of losing federal funding, districts throughout Virginia noti-
fied HEW of their plans to comply in 1965. The most popular route 
involved adopting freedom-of-choice plans, which allowed students to 
choose which schools they would attend. Although these plans placed 
the burden of desegregation on African Americans, and minimized 
desegregation in other ways, they were initially accepted by the federal 
government.88 By the summer of 1965, approximately 90 of the state's 
130 public school divisions had experienced some desegregation, and 
the process was scheduled to begin in most others that fall. 89 
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Still, the NAACP's efforts had failed to bring about widespread 
school integration in the state. HEW's desegregation guidelines prom-
ised to increase the pace of integration, but the department's acceptance 
of freedom-of-choice plans continued to place the burden of desegrega-
tion on African Americans, who-because of intimidation, community 
ties, and other factors,-often favored the status quo. 90 At the same 
time, federal courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court, refused to 
require school boards to undertake more active, and effective, integra-
tion efforts.91 In 1965, fewer than 12,000 of the approximately 235,000 
black students in Virginia went to desegregated schools.92 
In response to the slow pace of change, the NAACP launched a new 
wave of school desegregation litigation in the mid-1960s. Multiple law-
suits in Virginia attacked freedom-of-choice plans, which Lester Banks 
called "a continuation of Virginia's ll-year effort to stave off school 
integration."93 The NAACP also sought the nondiscriminatory assign-
ment of personnel and the abandonment of potentially discriminatory 
construction plans.94 Arguing that the burden of school desegregation 
belonged to local school boards, as opposed to African Americans, the 
NAACP asked federal courts to force local boards to take the initiative 
in integrating the public schools.95 
The most important new lawsuit in Virginia was based in New Kent 
County, just east of Richmond.96 Rural and conservative, the county had 
seen little racial change in the years since Brown v. Board of Education. 
The president of the local NAACP, Calvin Coolidge Green, had pressed 
the county to begin desegregation in the early 1960s to no avail. In 
response to the board's refusal, Green met with attorneys from the state 
NAACP and in early 1965 helped develop a lawsuit to force the school 
board to integrate the county's schools. Charles C. Green v. County 
School Board of New Kent County, Virginia, filed in Green's youngest 
son's name, was filed in March 1965. In the suit, NAACP attorneys 
pointed out that the county's schools remained 100 percent segregated 
eleven years after Brown. Faced with the NAACP lawsuit and pressure 
from HEW, the county adopted a freedom-of-choice plan in the summer 
of 1965, but the number of student transfers remained small. 
The lawsuit fared poorly in the lower federal courts. The U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of Virginia ruled against the NAACP 
in 1966, as did the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. Both ruled that the 
county's hastily developed freedom-of-choice plan fulfilled its require-
ment to integrate the county's schools. These decisions were disappoint-
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ing but not surprising, as other NAACP suits at this time suffered the 
same fate. 97 
After the ruling by the Fourth Circuit Court, NAACP attorneys 
debated their course of action, eventually choosing to take the Green 
case to the U.S. Supreme Court. As a test case to show that current 
desegregation programs-including freedom of choice-were not work-
ing, Green had a lot to offer. County demographics showed that school 
segregation prior to 1965 had been a deliberate policy, and the county's 
freedom-of-choice plan hadn't substantially altered the racial makeup of 
the schools. "We had all these school cases, and we wanted to get a case 
to be the pilot case so the Supreme Court could really break the log-
jam," former State Conference attorney Henry L. Marsh III explained. 
"New Kent was the logical choice. "98 The NAACP petitioned for, and 
was granted, certiorari by the Supreme Court. 
At the same time, the federal court system exhibited signs of a new 
attitude on the issue of school integration. In 1965 Judge J. Skelly 
Wright of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia predicted 
that the Supreme Court would eventually rule de facto school segrega-
tion unconstitutiona1.99 In 1967, Judge John Minor Wisdom of the Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals wrote that "boards and officials administering 
public schools have the affirmative duty under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to bring about an integrated, unitary school system in which there 
are no Negro schools and no white schools-just schools."lo0 The 
Supreme Court itself was also increasingly forceful in its denunciations 
of non-compliance. In Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Edward 
County (1964) the Court declared, "There has been entirely too much 
deliberation and not enough speed in enforcing the constitutional rights 
which we held in Brown v. Board of Education. "101 
On May 27, 1968, the Supreme Court issued its fuling in Charles C. 
Green v. County School Board of New Kent County. The Court found 
that the county was operating a dual system of schools, down to "every 
facet of school operations-faculty, staff, transportation, extracurricu-
lar activities and facilities." 102 This finding undermined the Court's 
1954-55 desegregation decisions, which put an affirmative duty on 
school boards to establish a "unitary, non-racial system of public edu-
cation." With regard to the county's freedom-of-choice plan, the Court 
noted, "it is relevant that this first step did not come until some 11 years 
after Brown I was decided and 1 0 years after Brown II directed the 
making of a 'prompt and reasonable start.'" Furthermore, "rather than 
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further the dismantling of the dual system, the [freedom-of-choice] plan 
has operated simply to burden children and their parents with a respon-
sibility which Brown II placed squarely on the School Board."103 
Echoing Judge Wisdom's ruling, the Court ordered the county 
school board to develop a plan to "convert promptly to a system with-
out a 'white' school and a 'Negro' school, but just schools." Though it 
did not rule that freedom-of-choice plans were necessarily unconstitu-
tional, the Court found that, where other plans could be more effective, 
they were preferable. Justice William J. Brennan, writing for the unani-
mous Court, wrote: "The burden on a school board today is to come 
forward with a plan that promises realistically to work, and promises 
realistically to work now." 104 
The impact of the Green decision spread far beyond the borders of 
New Kent County. It was Green that announced the duty of school 
boards to affirmatively eliminate all vestiges of state-imposed segrega-
tion, transforming Brown's prohibition of segregation into a require-
ment of integration and prompting Supreme Court Justice William H. 
Rehnquist to refer to Green later as a "drastic extension of Brown. "105 
Federal courts, recognizing that northern school segregation was related 
to discriminatory policies, also increasingly required northern school 
boards to re-fashion their desegregation plans to eliminate dual school 
systems as wel1. 106 
Across Virginia, school boards adjusted their policies to achieve the 
new mandate. In most cases, this meant abandoning freedom-of-choice 
plans in favor of more substantive measures. 107 The NAACP pushed 
those who hesitated, filing and renewing litigation in federal courts 
around the state. By the early 1970s, most districts had integrated their 
black and white student populations. In urban areas, this oftentimes 
meant busing students, which was angrily contested by whites. In rural 
areas around the state, geographically based attendance zones usually 
eliminated racially identifiable schools. lOS 
Within only a few years, aided by follow-up Supreme Court deci-
sions in 1969 and 1971, the nation witnessed the culmination of a key 
goal of the civil rights movement-the integration of southern public 
schools. l09 A National Park Service study of school desegregation in the 
United States explains: "The results were startling. In 1968-69, 32 per 
cent of black students in the South attended integrated schools; in 
1970-71, the number was 79 per cent."110 Acknowledging the deci-
sion's impact, the historian and legal scholar Davison Douglas calls 
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Green "the Court's most important school desegregation opinion since 
Brown."111 
Integration, unfortunately, did not come without a cost to African 
American communities, in Virginia or around the nation. In the South, 
integration was generally carried out under the control of white public 
officials, and decision making was not always even-handed. Many black 
schools in Virginia were closed or converted to lower-level schools dur-
ing the process, and African American educators and administrators 
were demoted and sometimes fired.1 12 
The battle over school desegregation in Virginia represents a key 
aspect of the struggle for black equality. The long-lasting campaign 
started in the 1800s, when Jim Crow schools were established in the 
state. In the twentieth century the NAACP initially fought to improve 
black educational opportunities in the commonwealth, before filing liti-
gation designed to overturn segregation in the early 1950s. Between 
1954 and 1959, as African Americans in the state fought to overcome 
massive resistance and bring about initial school desegregation, they also 
laid the groundwork for broader civil rights activism in the 1960s. While 
the NAACP continued to focus on educational opportunities, the larger 
black community worked to eliminate Jim Crow in other aspects of life. 
Federal government aid in the 1960s, along with growing support 
within the judiciary, aided the campaign for school desegregation, cul-
minating in the late 1960s with the desegregation of public education in 
Virginia. As the twenty-first century opens, attention remains focused on 
how to ensure equal educational opportunities for minority students 
throughout the state. 
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